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State–society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political
and social contention†
Ammon Cheskina and Luke Marchb*
aCentral and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 8 Lilybank Gardens, Glasgow G12 8AZ, UK;
bPolitics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
(Received 25 June 2014; accepted 15 June 2015)
Much existing analysis of Russian state–society relations focuses on public, active forms of
contention such as the “opposition” and protest movements. There is need for a more
holistic perspective which adds study of a range of overt, “co-opted”, and hidden forms of
interaction to this focus on public contention. A theoretical and empirical basis for
understanding state–society relations in today’s Russia involves broadening the concept of
“contentious politics” to include models of “consentful” as well as “dissentful” contention.
A diffused model of contentious politics can situate claim-making along the axes of
consentful and dissentful motivations, and compliant and contentious behaviours.
Keywords: Russia; contentious politics; protest; opposition; civil society
Prior to the contested 2011–2012 elections in Russia, many commentators held the view that
Russian society did not pose an existential threat to the country’s political status quo (Gel’man
2013, 6). While sporadic protests had occurred before 2011, they had been largely conﬁned to
speciﬁc geographic areas and tended to focus on relatively narrow issues (Evans 2012; Koesel
and Bunce 2012, 412). Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the vibrant street protests after
the elections caught most analysts by surprise (Volkov 2012, 55). Since then, there has been a com-
pensatory focus on new forms of opposition and public protest, evidence of instability within the
Putin regime and a (partial) movement away from the perception of the Russian state as an efﬁ-
ciently operating presidential vertikal (e.g. Monaghan 2012; Greene 2013; Judah 2013).
Much of the existing analysis, however, continues to focus on public, active forms of conten-
tion such as the “opposition” and social, issue-based movements that mobilise public protest (e.g.
Koesel and Bunce 2012; Robertson 2013; White 2013; Ross 2015). These accounts provide a
vitally important perspective on the interactions between state and society in contemporary
Russia. However, as Evans (2012, 234) notes, “We should not expect that the study of groups
in Russia that carry out public protests against the decisions of those in authority can give us a
comprehensive understanding of Russian civil society”. Chebankova (2015, 244) agrees,
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arguing that researchers “tend to conﬁne their analysis to the visible side of mobilisation, thus
ignoring its latent dimensions”.
This special issue therefore joins a growing body of works that seek to switch the analytical
lens more fully from state-centric analyses focusing on the mechanics of the Putinite presidential
system towards the emergent Russian politics “from below”. Such analyses (e.g. Beznosova and
Sundstrom 2009; Chebankova 2009; Robertson 2010; Gladarev and Lonkila 2013) make several
common arguments: (a) there has long been greater political contention in post-Soviet Russia than
many acknowledge; (b) such contention is often more marked at local level than in the cities of
Moscow and St Petersburg, but has received insufﬁcient attention and (c) the 2011–2012 protests
are therefore less a pivotal point than part of a complex interaction of continuity and change.
What our special issue adds to these approaches is a more holistic perspective with a detailed
focus on the overt-latent dimension. We add study of a range of overt, “co-opted” and hidden
forms of interaction to the existing focus on public contention. Speciﬁcally, the special issue pro-
vides a theoretical and empirical basis for understanding state–society relations in today’s Russia
by broadening the concept of “contentious politics” to include models of “consentful” as well as
“dissentful” contention. It is argued that while civil society is conceptually useful, the term is
often burdened by normative assumptions that can seek to over-emphasise clear distinctions
between state and society. In the Russian context this is counter-productive as it dismisses a
wide range of important state-sponsored and state-sanctioned activities that typify state–society
relations. At the same time, contentious politics, while less normative in its approach, suffers
from an inordinate focus on overt forms of political mobilisation. While this has facilitated a
number of important studies, it misses a wide spectrum of activities that cannot be easily cate-
gorised as openly contentious. Instead, building upon models of “consentful contention”, we
offer a diffused model of contentious politics that can situate claim-making along the axes of con-
sentful and dissentful motivations, and compliant and contentious behaviours.
The papers of this collection therefore point to the far more complex and nuanced ways that
political contention is enacted in the Russian context, both public and more opaque. The frame-
works employed throughout the various case studies draw attention not just to how and why pol-
itical contention occurs in contemporary Russia (which is the focus of most existing research), but
also how and why such contention either does not occur, or occurs in a way that is sanctioned or
modiﬁed by the Russian authorities. The papers shed light on the institutionalisation of political
claim-making and how, in many instances, the regime is able to move political contention into the
less threatening realm of social or ofﬁcially sanctioned contention. Based on empirical case
studies, the special issue outlines a theoretical framework that can be used to study not only pol-
itical contention but also the absence/complexity of such manifestations within semi-authoritarian
regimes.
Beyond civil society
While the literature and the debates on Russian civil society have generally been productive (for
example Evans, Henry, and Lisa 2006; Uhlin 2006; Chebankova 2013), the term civil society
itself is rendered less useful by competing normative and conceptual associations, in particular
the teleological democratisation approach associated with mainstream Western usage of the
term (Henry and Sundstrom 2006, 4). As Matt Killingsworth (2007, 74–75) argues, the term is
often “underpinned by an almost Fukuyamaesque triumphalism”, with an “implicit assumption
that the establishment of a ﬂourishing civil society is a given”.
Within this democratisation approach, civil society is often deﬁned in terms of its separateness
from the activities of the state, as an “arena” (Cohen and Arato 1992) for public participation in
political life outside of direct state control. Functioning democracy, for its part, is deﬁned in
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strictly liberal terms, rejecting corporatist models of state management. Additionally, one key
function of civil society is its ability to facilitate the “transition” from authoritarian to democratic
forms of governance. The transition experience of countries in South America in the 1980s pro-
vided clear examples of the value of civic activism. As numerous scholars have contended,
bottom-up mobilisation proved to be a key component in democratic transitions in the region
(see Evans [2011]; for a rebuttal of these positions, see Encarnación [2003]).
Certainly there is much merit to this idea that a vibrant civil society, separate from the state,
can be a vital component of democratisation. However, a major problem with this approach, in the
context of post-communist transformation, is the presumption that post-communist states have all
been transitioning (or have transitioned) to more democratic forms of governance. For example,
Anders Uhlin (2006, 35) explicitly utilises a transition framework in order to study civil society in
Russia and the Baltic states, but notes that civil society plays fundamentally different roles in
different transition periods; changing from “a countervailing force against an authoritarian
regime” to “a mixture of state-supporting and countervailing functions”. In the general literature
on civil society there has therefore been a “civil society backlash” (Encarnación 2006, 357), as
analysts contest the idea of simple, direct connections between “a growth in associational life
and democratization” (Lewis 2013, 327).
As regards Russia, the study of civil society through this prism of transition is particularly
problematic because most commentators would now agree with Alfred Evans (2011, 40), that
“if Russia did enter a transition to democracy, that transition was not successful”. The consensus
view of Russia is that it is now a relatively stable “electoral” or “competitive” authoritarian
regime, in which limited (“managed” or “licensed”) political contention plays an important legit-
imating and information function, but is deprived of any real autonomous, countervailing ability
(e.g. Robertson 2010; Ross 2011; Gill 2012).
The evident absence of transitional dynamics is one of the main reasons why the concept of
civil society, notwithstanding its general usefulness, is conceptually deﬁcient in understanding
social movements in Russia today. In addition, there are some general deﬁciencies with the
term that particularly apply to Russia. The focus on transition capability often leads to a
narrow empirical focus (e.g. on pro-democracy/pro-Western NGOs or social movements). At
its worst, this leads to a caricatured view of Russia, whereby researchers’ distaste for Putin can
lead to exaggerated claims about Russia’s roll-back of democracy relying purely on anecdotal evi-
dence, and ignoring substantive positive developments, particularly at the local level (Javeline
and Lindemann-Komarova 2010).
In addition, it is “uncivil society”, that is, undemocratic or anti-Western movements (such as
Russia’s vibrant radical nationalist realm) that are often the most authentic social movements, in
terms of genuine public support and mass organisations (e.g. Kopecký and Mudde 2003). Ana-
lysts of the Middle East, for example, have recently begun to broaden deﬁnitions of civil society
to include non-liberal actors, including Islamic ones (Khatib 2013; Lewis 2013).
Moreover, the civil society concept is especially deﬁcient in understanding how a regime such
as Vladimir Putin’s reacts to, and attempts to interact with, bottom-up social movements. Such
efforts are usually conceptualised (if at all) as state co-option of civil society (Aron 2013). Admit-
tedly, a number of scholars have developed complex models of civil society that have factored in
the role of the state (Kubik 2007). Nevertheless, civil society’s narrow focus generally fails to
direct sufﬁcient attention towards state-sponsored activities that go beyond mere co-option and
can provide channels for the performance of sanctioned contention. Unlike the transitioning
countries of South America in the 1980s, the Soviet successor states had to deal with the particular
legacy of state/society entwinement that characterised the Soviet period. According to some (e.g.
Ljubownikow, Crotty, and Rodgers 2013), this legacy has involved integration of social organis-
ations into “vertical power” arrangements, whereby their role is to monitor and control society,
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instead of doing so to the state. The presence of an increasing number of “marionette” organis-
ations (Cook and Vinogradova 2006, 34) which mimic “real” civil society groups is the clearest
example of this legacy in the post-Soviet era.
Other analysts, however, posit a more complex legacy. For instance, for McFaul and Tryger
(2004, 139), the main result of the Soviet past in Russia today is that it remains very difﬁcult to
distinguish distinct political and civic spaces. A particularly pertinent example is Russia’s
GONGOs (government-organised non-governmental organisations). Julie Hemment (2012)
argues that one of Russia’s main GONGOs, the pro-Kremlin Nashi movement, which is often
characterised as a form of ofﬁcial indoctrination of youth akin to the Soviet komsomol or an
“ersatz social movement” (Robertson 2010, 28), actually plays (albeit only ﬁtfully) a role in pro-
moting more civic forms of social activity (such as volunteer work, and environmental and anti-
corruption campaigns). Accordingly, Nashi paradoxically resembles some of the internationally
sponsored NGOs that preceded it, and which it ostensibly opposes. Atwal and Bacon (2012,
265) concur that “Nashi does have some of the traits of a civil society organisation that might
be seen to promote gradual democratisation”.
There is thus a need to move beyond civil society’s narrow empirical focus and theoretical
conﬁnes. We outline an expanded model of (consentful) contention that is less normative, and
which has a broader empirical sweep. This allows us, we argue, to account for a much wider var-
iance in regime type and state/society interactions. It should be noted that our intention is not to
reject the term “civil society” in toto, and the often-valuable insights much of this literature brings
(indeed it is used by White and Bindman in this collection). However, we argue that, if it is used it
should be employed as follows: (1) as a concept that can be used within the frameworks of con-
tentious politics. It remains useful where the focus remains on overt political contention and insti-
tutionalised public state–society relations (i.e. as structured forms of what we describe below as
“consentful” and “dissentful” contention); (2) in a non-normative fashion, where civil society’s
role in democratisation needs to be proved, not assumed, and the role of “uncivil” society and
other forms of contention is taken equally into account. Nevertheless, we would argue that the
model of consentful contention outlined below can cover the terrain of civil society and more,
and in particular helps focus on the non-institutionalised, informal and complex realms of
claim-making that cannot be encompassed by a neat state/political society/civil society
trichotomy.
Contentious politics
As an analytical tool and conceptual approach, “contentious politics” differs from civil society in
a number of fundamental ways. While clearly demonstrating conceptual overlap with civil
society, contentious politics is most commonly applied as an approach that studies bottom-up
movements and events that are speciﬁcally directed towards (most commonly against) incumbent
political authorities. Tilly (1995, 2001), later working in collaboration with McAdam and Tarrow
(McAdam,Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), was inﬂuential in formulating a “process-mechanism”
approach that could be applied to the study of contentious politics (see also Tarrow 2012, 21–
26). While acknowledging that most collective action occurs outside politics, these authors
were interested in actions that speciﬁcally affect government policies and interests. Tilly and
Tarrow therefore deﬁne contentious politics as the space where politics, contention and collective
action intersect:
Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s
interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which govern-
ments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4)
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The process-mechanism approach outlines the interaction of mechanisms (events that change
relations among speciﬁed sets of elements) and processes (frequently occurring combinations
of mechanisms) (Tilly 1995, 2001). This approach allowed scholars to examine and document
how various changes in opportunity structures (mechanisms) were able to facilitate participation
in collective action (processes). Focusing on cognitive, relational and environmental mechan-
isms,1 Tilly provided a relatively coherent empirical framework to study political contention
whereby public moments of political contention could be catalogued and analysed systematically.
The process-mechanism approach has been subject to its fair share of criticism, not least for
the vague and sweeping manner that mechanisms are all too easily introduced to explain any
event (Norkus 2005). Nevertheless, this approach has been effectively employed to examine
numerous examples of contention in many geographical locations. For example, in the former
Soviet space this framework has been successfully applied by Beissinger (2011). Beissinger
examined the causal mechanisms that enabled millions of Ukrainians to participate in protests
during the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. This focus is particularly useful in understanding the
short-term dynamics that enabled protest organisers to create horizontal links between diverse
groups of participants, and to use the organisational structures of election campaigning in
order to bring people onto the streets, thereby facilitating a bandwagoning effect.
While this approach is particularly applicable to the study of speciﬁc moments of contention,
it has arguably been less successful in cataloguing the ostensible absence of contention in certain
polities. It is perfectly feasible to document and study public events such as industrial strike action
or public protests. In places such as Russia, however, an equally important question to consider is
how we might explain the relative lack of overt political mobilisation. This is especially true when
taking into account the regime type currently found in Russia.
The literature on social movements and contention increasingly suggests that regime type and
state capability are both potentially key factors in determining the frequency, form and depth of
political contention (Tilly 2004; Boudreau 2005; Davenport 2007; Robertson 2010). It is this con-
ceptual focus that makes contentious politics so useful in researching bottom-up movements and
mobilisation in contemporary Russia. Instead of viewing social movements as part of a wider
struggle for democratisation, contentious politics can be viewed through the prism of political
claim-making within a speciﬁc (transitioning or non-transitioning) political regime. Additionally,
it allows for a complex analysis of reciprocal state/society interactions.
This is not to say that democratisation has been neglected by social movement theorists. On
the contrary, democratisation has often been a key concept for analyses of structural changes in
political opportunities (e.g. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Nevertheless, even with this focus,
bottom-up activism is not seen solely as a mechanism leading to democratisation. In many
respects this structural approach is an inversion of the civil society tradition; instead of examining
the potential for civil society to effect political change and to lay the basis for democratisation,
focus is placed on how changes to state capacity and opportunity affect social mobilisation.
Most social movement theorists agree that in open polities where opportunities for engage-
ment with state authorities are high, the likelihood for social mobilisation is relatively low
(Smith and Fetner 2010, 16). This is because actors have less need to mobilise and have incentives
to utilise existing channels for political debate and redress. On the other hand, in polities where
political opportunities are greatly restricted through the enactment of highly authoritarian policies,
the chances for mobilisation are effectively repressed. As a result, it is regimes that lie between
these two poles that face the greatest potential for social unrest and oppositional activism.
Graeme Robertson, in his excellent study of political protest in Russia, builds upon the litera-
ture on contentious politics and sets out a model speciﬁc to hybrid regimes. He deﬁnes regime
hybridity as a situation wherein “some legitimate and public political competition coexists
with an organizational and institutional playing ﬁeld that renders this competition unfair”
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(Robertson 2010, 6). Additionally Robertson notes that it is important to distinguish between
stable hybrid regimes and transitioning/collapsing ones (24). Although Russia has exhibited
increasing trends towards state repression (particularly since 2012), as an electoral authoritarian
system (see David White’s contribution to this collection) it is clearly a “hybrid regime” in
Robertson’s deﬁnition. Therefore we might expect more political contention than in either rela-
tively more open, or relatively more closed, political systems.
Robertson demonstrates the feasibility of examining speciﬁc protests or strikes in order to
apply a retrospective analysis of the causal factors that lay beneath the surface of these events.
He also uses a structural framework to examine how the state represses contention according
to three key variables: organisational ecology, mobilisation strategies and elite competition
(24–35). Nevertheless, Robertson’s approach, while largely eschewing the term civil society, con-
tinues the focus on open political claim-making that is characteristic of the concept. Contention is
therefore deﬁned in terms of overt political acts of dissention. This focus is clearly useful in under-
standing the role of the state in controlling and co-opting overt contentious politics. However, it
also potentially misses out some of the more complex ways that contention is enacted in the
context of Russia’s stable hybrid regime.
Forms of contention: from dissentful to consentful
A useful development in the literature on contentious politics, and one that allows the researcher
to examine in more detail the lack rather than the existence of overt contention, is the emergence
of the concept of “consentful contention”. For Jeremy Straughn (2005, 1611), social action varies
along behavioural and motivational axes. He notes that “standpoints” (motivations) can range
from consentful to dissentful and that behaviour varies from compliant to contentious. Within
this grid, consentful contention represents the moment when behaviour is contentious but motiv-
ations are consentful. In other words, consentful contention describes a contentious act wherein
the political claim is not directed against the authorities per se. Using the case study of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), Straughn documents how contentious claims were often presented
to the authorities that were framed in terms of the dominant state ideology. For Straughn, consent-
ful contention was enacted in the GDR when individuals presented political claims to the auth-
orities by utilising ofﬁcial channels and adopting “the persona of a dutiful citizen” (1601).
This form of contention differs from “dissentful contention” (contention with anti-regime
motivation), “consentful compliance” (compliance backed by ﬁrm ideological motivation) and
“dissentful compliance” (begrudging compliance that lacks ideological motivation). Within the
context of contemporary Russia and contentious politics within Russia, these categories open
up important avenues for investigation. With the relative absence of sustained, visible forms of
dissentful contention (with the principal exception of the 2011/2012 protests as described in
White’s article in this volume), the current literature suggests that the Russian public generally
displays either consentful or dissentful compliance. That is, it is often assumed that when
people lack strong motivations regarding the political system they do not take any contentious
action because they are repressed, and when they have such motivations they inevitably
comply with the authorities. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the 2011/2012 protests, commenta-
tors have paid a great deal of attention to the legislative measures adopted by the Putin regime
enacted to quash popular protest. These measures have included a clampdown on foreign ﬁnan-
cing of NGOs (Lavinski 2013), measures to curb freedom of speech and the right to public assem-
bly (Lanskoy and Suthers 2013, 77–81) and the redirection of popular discontent towards foreign
entities (Toepﬂ 2011). In other words, ﬁtting with the above-mentioned structural tradition, it has
been common to focus on repressive methods that have reduced political opportunity structures
(e.g. Koesel and Bunce 2012).
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In these analyses, the co-option of society by the Russian state is not always ignored. It is,
however, under-conceptualised and assumed to be an aspect of state control that enforces either
consentful or dissentful compliance (e.g. Horvath 2012). For instance, Ljubownikow, Crotty,
and Rodgers (2013) outline a “Russian-style” model of civil society (“civil society po-russki”),
designed to create spaces of representation that do not clash with state interests, but which, in
fact, directly feed into state aims and programmes. While their assessment is fruitful, especially
their linkage between Soviet repertoires of state–society relations and present forms of civic
engagement, they do not fully capture the (consentfully) contentious elements within this model.
Instead they note that “in a Russian-style civil society, [third sector organisations] absorb and
negate civil society’s potential and in return are rewarded by the state with cooperation” (163).
Julie Hemment’s aforementioned study of the Nashi movement (2012) offers a fresh perspective
by applying an anthropological approach. Hemment is able to contextualise Russia’s supposedly
“virtual democracy” within popular dissatisfaction with externally imposed, neo-liberal models
of political and social organisation. This approach is able to critique normative and simpliﬁed con-
ceptualisations that depict Russian-style civil society as bad and undemocratic. Nonetheless
Hemment still outlines a model of civil society “in the service of the state” (245).
Our central argument is not that it is wrong to study the structural co-option of Russian civil
society, or the repression of contention. Structural accounts have proven very useful in aiding our
understanding of Russian politics. Robertson, for example, provides a balanced analysis of how
the Russian authorities have been “at the cutting edge of contemporary authoritarian regime
design” (2009, 547), and have been able to repress political opposition through the enactment
of hard and soft repression. This soft repression entails channelling political participation into
ofﬁcially sanctioned avenues. Certainly Robertson’s account, and the broader literature
(cf. Balzer 2003), suggests that Russian society has been, to a certain degree, co-opted or
“managed”, leading to either consentful or dissentful compliance. Even for Hemment, who
acknowledges Nashi’s important social function, society is co-opted by ensuring that social acti-
vism is maintained within strictly deﬁned state limits. While these trends are evident in today’s
Russia, our argument is that we also need to take account of instances where contention is less
visible and not always directed explicitly against the state.
In this volume, for example, Catherine Owen elaborates upon the framework of consentful
contention to explain how the Russian authorities have been able to utilise Public Monitoring
Commissions to provide ofﬁcially sanctioned channels for political claim-making. A key distinc-
tion made by Owen is that, whereas it is customary to treat contentious politics within a state/
society binary, consentful acts of contention can be located within state/semi-state structures.
In other words, individuals can make contentious political claims without posing an existential
threat to the state authorities. In this way, the claims, though small, are difﬁcult for the authorities
to ignore, and are often successful as a result.
What the consentful contention model adds to previous analyses is that it focuses on how even
co-option is a nuanced, changing phenomenon, that is not simply a form of state control. In fact it
allows a certain level of challenge and contention. However, the balance between co-option,
control and contention varies over space, social sector and time. In addition, while there is
indeed an undeniable degree of co-option, the Russian authorities have also displayed a level
of sophistication that is too often overlooked by structural analyses. The Putin regime has not
only repressed or diverted contention. In addition to repressive measures, the Russian authorities
have also purposefully created mechanisms that facilitate certain, state-approved forms of dom-
estic, sanctioned contention. The role of such forms of contention is certainly open to debate. For
instance Gilbert and Balzer (2012, 367) argue for complex analyses that place “Putin’s pro-
gramme in a context of ‘authoritarian upgrading’: the regime seeks public involvement in
funding and providing public goods while limiting political claims”. Crotty (2009) sees social
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organisations of three types, either grass-roots organisations apolitical and invisible to the state,
policy organisations dependent on foreign funding and often lacking strong societal links and
marionette organisations whose role is conﬁned to consultancy work or being adjuncts of the
state. Thus, where NGOs are (rarely) involved in approved dialogue with the state, it is usually
in highly subservient positions as “putative” representatives of civil society rather than active
participants.
Other analyses are more optimistic about the possibilities of ofﬁcially sanctioned contention.
Using examples from other authoritarian countries, Lewis (2013, 326) argues that where state and
civil society groups have shared goals, this can produce a “productive symbiosis”, wherein the
state is a potential ally and rich source of resources. In their study of Russian women’s crisis
centres, Johnson and Saarinen (2011) argue that, at their best, such organisations have a collabora-
tive relationship with local ofﬁcials, holding them accountable to addressing gender violence.
Similarly, Jakobson and Sanovich (2010, 296) argue that “third sector” organisations may be
made vulnerable by co-operation with the state, but can conversely use such co-operation as “a
sphere in which varied not-for-proﬁt activities coexist”.
Away of bridging these divergent understandings is by focussing on the role of claim-making
as central to mechanisms of state-sanctioned contention. Laura Henry notes that Russian citizens
have a number of outlets for making direct petitions and complaints to the Russian authorities.
These include the State Duma, the Public Chamber, the President’s Council on Human Rights
and the Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce (Henry 2012, 246). Drawing on Soviet experience, these
institutions simultaneously provide procedural means to air grievances, while also fulﬁlling the
important function of providing timely feedback to the regime. Following Johnston and
Mueller (2001), we may refer to these procedures as “unobtrusive practices of contention”
which were visible even in the Soviet era (Henry 2012, 244–245). These ofﬁcially sanctioned
mechanisms necessarily blur the lines between the state/society dichotomy detailed above and
give further credence to the idea that we should set aside liberal notions of a clear division
between these two poles.
Instead, we should treat “Civil society po-russki” as a dualistic concept (Kulmala 2011, 58).
That is to say that Putin’s version of civil society is used both to repress forms of civil society
organisation directed against the state and to mobilise society and societal participation. Catherine
Owen, in this volume, notes that this results in the liminality of many forms of contention in
Russia – practices “are not always situated clearly on either side of the state-society boundary
or, if they are, they neither fully endorse nor fully reject the political status quo”. Similarly,
David White’s contribution argues that the boundaries between political society and civil
society are “blurred” and mutable: often contested, as often symbiotic. Nevertheless, despite
what Owen calls the “grey area” between state and society, some clearer patterns do emerge.
Speciﬁcally, Russian-style civil society is deliberately geared towards the provision of social
goods and services. Eleanor Bindman and Anna Tarasenko, in this volume, discuss how the
Russian state plays, and indeed is expected to play, a leading role in social welfare provision
for Russian citizens. This means that, as Kulmala (2011) argues, a number of civil society organ-
isations beneﬁt greatly from cooperation with state institutions. For Bindman, a crucial distinction
is made between economic and social rights on the one hand and civic and political rights on the
other. Just as in Soviet times, the Russian authorities prioritise social and economic rights and are
willing to sponsor NGOs that are deemed to be working towards these goals. As Bindman points
out, while commentators from outside Russia have largely focused on human rights NGOs, in
Russia these represent only a small proportion of the NGO community.
Clearly then, in the Russian context, it is important to consider not only the distinction between
state and society but also the distinction between social and political forms of activism – in other
words, activities that the authorities frame as legitimate or illegitimate (see Bindman’s contribution).
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In this respect Russia fundamentally differs from the GDR or other “Leninist regimes” (Johnston
and Mueller 2001) where the consentful contention model has previously been utilised. True, a
lot of activity is similar. A major form of consentful contention, then as now, consists in appealing
to authorities to adhere to their own legislation, for instance in the prison or electoral realms (Owen
and White’s contributions), or in the sphere of social provision (Bindman, Tarasenko and Turbine’s
contributions).
Yet in Leninist regimes the state was underpinned by a concrete ideology, which, according to
Straughn, allowed citizens to present claims to the authorities and justify them in terms of the
overriding communist ideals. With the lack of a clearly deﬁned state ideology today, it is impor-
tant for the Russian authorities to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable contentious
claims. As the papers of this volume attest, this has generally resulted in a situation whereby
social claims are acceptable but political ones are not, despite their equal constitutional status.
In particular, White’s contribution shows how the street rather than the legislature has become
the “natural habitat” for “dissentful contention”, with the onus thus put on (as yet rudimentary)
attempts to co-ordinate a hitherto “un-organised civil society” which has exceedingly poor
links to the intra-systemic “political society”. With similarities to the Soviet era, it is generally
more productive for citizens to avoid dissentful contention altogether and utilise the possibility
of presenting claims while simultaneously maintaining “the persona of a dutiful citizen”
(Straughn 2005, 1601). For instance, Bindman shows that, whereas the relationship between
human rights NGOs and the state is often antagonistically dissentfully contentious, for the
“social” NGOs the relationship is “complex, nuanced and mutually constitutive”, usually
varying between consentful contention (pressing the authorities to honour their constitutional
commitments as a “social state”) and consentful compliance (not critiquing the “social state”
repertoire but recognising that co-operation with the state is the most effective way to “get
things done”).
Of course, it is inevitably difﬁcult always to maintain a clear distinction between social and
political claims. As Vikki Turbine’s contribution argues, whereas many feminist claims were once
treated as politically neutral social demands, they are now considered fundamentally as political
claims. This can be attributed to Putin’s increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions against “western”
forms of intervention in Russian society (underpinned by what Turbine refers to as the regime’s
emphasis on a “hetronormative brand of patriotism”). Political and social concepts that are expli-
citly linked with “western” or liberal forms of political organisation are therefore increasingly
targeted as anti-regime. This is borne out by recent legislative measures directed against
western-ﬁnanced NGOs (Lavinski, 2013) and support for same-sex relationships (Wilkinson,
2013). In effect this means that, in the absence of an overarching state ideology, the current
regime establishes increasingly clear boundaries between “legitimate” (patriotic) and “non-legit-
imate” (western, unpatriotic) claims. This helps citizens to understand the areas that would require
dissentful, rather than consentful, contention in order to present a claim. As Turbine documents,
the response of many Russian women has traditionally been not to challenge the consensus at all.
As a result, while many women are keen to make social claims, they commonly avoid wider fem-
inist claims which would require more dissentful forms of contention. Consentful compliance
and, to a lesser extent, consentful contention, therefore pre-dominate, and human rights speciﬁc
to women are generally regarded as a “non-topic”. Given the example made of the Pussy Riot
group by the Putin regime, the prohibition on non-legitimate activities may act to reinforce
such compliance.
Anna Tarasenko’s contribution, analysing regional welfare reforms, reveals other interesting
complexities. Like Bindman, she argues that the regime’s constitutionally deﬁned status as a
“social state” is partially belied by continuing aspects of neo-liberal social policy. In the St Peters-
burg case that she analyses, neo-liberal reforms are used both to empower civil society (by
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encouraging NGOs’ role in service provision) and to depoliticise it (by emphasising regional and
individual responsibility). However, unlike the consentful organisations highlighted by Bindman,
she argues that this clash between statist and neo-liberal conceptions of welfare has the potential
to be a major locus for contention. In St Petersburg at least, this results in a variety of strategies for
social NGOs. On the one hand, in keeping with neo-liberal logic, certain private organisations
become the primary service providers for social activities formerly provided by the state. In
such instances, Tarasenko argues that contention is largely prevented as the state manages to
channel the political issue of responsibility for social service provision into managerial tasks
and to provide such organisations with ongoing incentives for compliant relations with the
state via regular funding competitions.
On the other hand, the Russian state preserves a number of paternalistic features that were
characteristic of the Soviet welfare system. As a result, there is still space for strategies of con-
sentful contention for a number of social NGOS. Many such organisations still beneﬁt dispropor-
tionally from state funding and support and in return do not challenge state policy per se. Instead,
their contention is focussed on how policy is implemented in reality, and as such they aim to shape
the authorities’ social agenda. As with many other aspects of contentious politics noted through-
out this volume, the result is not devoid of tensions, but results in a largely symbiotic situation: the
state manages to implement potentially unpopular reforms, while certain social NGOs continue to
lobby for the amelioration of these reforms.
In summary, our volume aims to address the need for wider study of Russian societal par-
ticipation in Russian political life than offered by conventional civil society approaches. Con-
trary to many analyses, simple dichotomies between state/society, co-optation/autonomy,
repression/protest, etc. are far from clear-cut in today’s Russia. By analysing social movements
and social participation using the analytical lenses of consentful contention, dissentful conten-
tion, dissentful compliance and consentful compliance, we are able to produce more nuanced
analyses of contemporary, political society–civil society relationships. As detailed above, the
nature of contentious politics in Russia varies widely across a number of axes. The most impor-
tant factors identiﬁed include the site of contention relative to the state (e.g. whether contention
occurs in national or regional state bodies, or is fully or partially intra- or extra-institutional as is
the Russian opposition). Also relevant are regime norms, which set the general boundaries of
legitimate political contestation, but which vary greatly depending on the locus and topic of
contention.
Finally, the strategies of civil society organisations themselves, their representativeness and
the degree to which they can (or want to) achieve a symbiosis of their aspirations with some
or all regime norms, much affect the success of their actions. The papers of this volume bring
together many of these issues and study various forms of contention in the Russian context.
The articles in this collection have diverse foci, ranging from civil society actors (Bindman),
women’s human rights (Turbine), Public Monitoring Commissions (Owen), overt political
protest (White) and welfare reform (Tarasenko). Ultimately, none of these contributions funda-
mentally challenge the prevalent view of an essentially authoritarian Russian state with a claim
to set social norms, and managed political contention from above. Nevertheless, they all add
greatly to our understanding of the diverse ways that individuals and groups aim to use this
authoritarian framework for their own interests from below, often clandestinely, but often success-
fully, and in which politically contentious claims are suppressed, co-opted, but sometimes even
explicitly encouraged by the Russian state.
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Note
1. Tilly deﬁned environmental mechanisms as “externally generated inﬂuences on conditions affecting
social life”, cognitive mechanisms as “alterations of individual and collective perception” and relational
mechanisms as “connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks” (Tilly 2001, 24).
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